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Supplement to  
Survey of USSR Broadcasts

THE JEWISH QUESTION IN SOVIET AND SATELLITE PROPAGANDA

W A R N I N G

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Supplement to  
Survey of USSR Broadcasts

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## THE JEWISH QUESTION IN SOVIET AND SATELLITE PROPAGANDA

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. This study traces Soviet and Satellite propaganda relevant to the Jewish question from 1946 to January 1953, shortly after the Slansky trial and the Soviet "doctors' plot." It is based largely on radio broadcasts.

2. In line with the refusal of Leninist-Stalinist theory to recognize the Jews as a people or as a nation and its stand on assimilation as the only answer to the Jewish problem, Soviet propaganda, both internal and external, ignores the Jews as such. They are referred to as Jews in internal propaganda neither in laudatory references, as in awarding Stalin prizes, nor, customarily, in defamatory propaganda. There is no longer a Yiddish press in the USSR, Moscow does not broadcast in Yiddish to its two million Jews, and no theoretical journals are published in Yiddish. In Moscow's program of foreign-language broadcasting, which includes 34 languages, Hebrew to Israel is not represented.

Soviet propaganda, during and since World War II, has consistently avoided any propaganda which would foster the concept of a homogeneous Jewish group among the Russian people. Propaganda on Nazi atrocities during the war rarely mentioned the word "Jew" despite the obvious fact that the great majority of victims were Jews. Since the war Soviet propaganda has almost completely avoided exploiting manifestations of anti-Semitism in the West, presumably because such exploitation would encourage the growth of Jewish solidarity. The most recent example of this taboo has been Moscow's refusal to utilize the Rosenberg trial in anti-American propaganda.

3. Before the Prague trial Soviet propaganda had only once since 1945 manifested signs of anti-Semitism: in the campaign against the literary "cosmopolitans" in 1948-49 it used the original Jewish names of the sinners in parentheses after the adopted Russian names. Jewish writers, however, were only one of the most likely targets for a politically motivated attack against all internationalist aspects of Soviet culture which ran counter to the increasing stress of Great Russian nationalism. That the Jews were only part of a larger target and that the encouragement of anti-Semitism was not the goal was indicated by failure of Soviet internal radio propaganda to exploit the Jewish names for mass consumption, by confinement of the attack largely to the literary and Party press, and by stopping the use of Jewish names after March 1949, although the campaign against cosmopolitanism has continued to date.

4. The earliest Soviet warnings against Zionism significantly coincided with the campaign against "cosmopolitans," at a time when the newly consolidated state of Israel was undoubtedly attracting the

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sympathies and loyalties of many Jews, particularly intellectuals, behind the Iron Curtain. This sympathy must have been encouraged by the Soviet's expedient support for Zionism in 1947-48, when it was utilized as a political weapon to harass the British. This support, misjudged by Orbit Jews as a Kremlin change in attitude toward traditionally hostile Zionism, must have served to fertilize the feeling of kinship to international Jewry throughout the Orbit.

That the Kremlin recognized this danger is evident from the first Soviet anti-Zionist statements which appeared in PRAVDA and LITERARY GAZETTE in the fall of 1948, soon after Israel had been consolidated and more than one year before it was attacked by the Russians for its foreign policy. These first charges stressed that the concepts of "an international Jewish people" and an "international Jewish literature" were treasonable and that allegiance to a "mystic" Jewish nation was incompatible with Soviet patriotism. These charges were not followed by any considerable anti-Zionist propaganda for mass consumption. There had been virtual silence on the subject in Soviet radio propaganda since.

5. The major outlines of Communist radio propaganda on the Jewish question since 1948, however, bear out the implication of this early significant charge, apparently intended for Party elite, that the Kremlin regards the possibility of divided allegiance on the part of the Jews as dangerous, particularly in the Satellites, and that this internal problem is more serious than any posed by Israel's foreign policy. Israel's gravitation toward the West aggravates the internal threat, of course. This propaganda has been targeted on the Satellite Jews themselves, especially those in Rumania and Poland, through Warsaw and Bucharest broadcasts in Yiddish. Only minimal and largely insignificant use has been made of anti-Israel propaganda to non-Jewish audiences and no use, before the Prague trial, of anti-Zionist propaganda. Moscow propaganda has manifested occasional concern over Israel's foreign policy but has generally ignored the country except for scattered items concerning Israel's alleged role in American military plans for the Middle East.

6. The Warsaw and Bucharest Yiddish programs, along with Bucharest broadcasts in Rumanian to Israel, blacken the image of life in Israel by stressing inflation, poor housing, economic hardships, etc., and discredit the very concept of a Jewish state by pointing out that the "class struggle" against Jewish "capitalists" goes on unremittingly even in Israel. At the same time, they plug the great progress being made throughout Eastern Europe in integrating the Jews into productive life. The evident propaganda aim is to disillusion potential Jewish emigrants from Eastern Europe and to combat the serious challenge of Diaspora Zionism to Jewish loyalty throughout the Orbit. Israel's alignment in the Cold War has thus been only a secondary target in the major attack on the concept of an international Jewry.

7. Other considerations in Moscow's propaganda on the Jewish question and on Israel have been matters of expediency. Moscow broadcast in Yiddish to North America during the war and for a time after

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when it sought to gain American Jewish support for the war effort. This was the only Soviet propaganda which ever discussed anti-Semitism as an evil or ever sought to project Soviet Jewry. None of it appeared in internal broadcasts. The broadcast was discontinued in March 1949, soon after the attack on "cosmopolitans" had begun.

Similarly, Soviet propaganda utilized Jewish nationalism and the establishment of Israel in 1947-48 as a weapon with which to attack the British. When it no longer was useful, and the weapon itself became dangerous, the propaganda reversed itself. Since 1949, Soviet and Satellite propaganda has become increasingly vehement in scattered attacks on Israel, but they have been a minor element except in propaganda to the Jews themselves.

8. The Slansky trial and the Soviet "doctors' plot" mark a relative deluge in Cominform propaganda on the Jews. It is the first time that Zionism and "Jewish bourgeois nationalism" have ever been so vigorously denounced in mass propaganda. The release of the "doctors' plot" story in the USSR was anticipated by two days in a Ukrainian regional reference to "Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalists and Zionists," the first such reference ever observed on a Ukrainian radio.

Viewed in the perspective of previous propaganda, this new campaign confirms the thesis that the Kremlin has been apprehensive about the loyalty of the Jews in Eastern Europe ever since the consolidation of Israel in 1948 and is now serving severe notice that Zionism is as grave a sin as Trotskyism, Titoism, and right-wing Socialism.

9. Although it is apparent that the aims of Soviet foreign policy would not be damaged if the anti-Zionist echoes of the Prague trial and the "doctors' plot" were heard and amplified in the Arab world, as they were in fact by Damascus and other Moslem propagandists, Soviet radio propaganda to the Arab world has not sought to capitalize on these developments, just as it had not sought to exploit anti-Semitic situations in the past.

10. The unprecedented "vigilance" propaganda which has followed the Slansky trial and the "doctors' plot," subordinating the anti-Jewish aspects of the propaganda, indicates that the Jews are once again, as in the campaign against the "cosmopolitans," only part of a larger target, namely the tightening of Orbit security and discipline. That the Kremlin has for the first time on such a scale resorted to evoking even a restrained anti-Semitism, however, is testament to the gravity with which it now views the question of Jewish loyalty and the larger problem of internal security.

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I. ANTI-SEMITISM - 1946 to SLANSKY TRIAL

A great many of the peculiarities of Communist propaganda relating to the Jew can be understood only in the light of two important factors: (1) Leninist-Stalinist theory on the Jews, and (2) the exigencies of Soviet internal and external policy. Both have been decisive determinants in the history of Soviet policy toward its own Jewish minority and toward the Zionist movement.

It is of fundamental importance that Lenin and Stalin never recognized the Jews as a nation. Lenin insisted as early as 1903 that "the idea of a separate Jewish people is reactionary in its political implications and utterly untenable scientifically." Jewish national aspirations and a Jewish national culture were regarded as fraudulent concepts. The Jews, according to Lenin, and to Stalin after him, were a "caste" and not a nation. They remained a caste wherever they were not allowed to assimilate. Where they were allowed to assimilate, however, there was no Jewish problem. The Bolshevik answer, then, to the Jewish question has been the removal of all administrative restrictions imposed on the Jews by Tsarism and the encouragement of complete assimilation. The establishment of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast was a fortuitous prewar exception.

A. THE ASSIMILATION GOAL

The aim of assimilation which characterizes Soviet internal policy toward its two million Jews is reflected in the pose of Soviet internal propaganda which completely ignores the Jews as Jews. It similarly accounts for the hostile Soviet attitude toward Zionism, which has been illegal in the USSR since the first days of the Revolution.

Internally, it is manifested as follows: with the possible exception of one small local paper in Birobidjan, there is no longer a Yiddish press in the Soviet Union; no Soviet theoretical journals are published in Yiddish; and the Jewish public school has almost completely disappeared. Consistent with this policy, Moscow does not broadcast in Yiddish to its two million Jews and neither Moscow nor any other Cominform country broadcasts in Hebrew to Israel, apparently because the Cominform refuses to accept the idea of Jewish nationalism even though it had proved expedient in 1947 to support it in order to harass the British. Bucharest has directed a broadcast to Israel since 1950 and has spearheaded Cominform propaganda on and to Israel since 1948; but its broadcasts are in Rumanian, not in Hebrew, and are addressed to "all decent people" abroad. Warsaw and Bucharest do broadcast in Yiddish to Jews at home and throughout Europe and North America, a dialectic concession less compromising than the use of Hebrew, the linguistic embodiment of Jewish nationalism. The suppression of Jewish culture has not yet gone as far in Poland and Rumania as it has in Russia, where also a considerable freedom had been permitted the Jewish press and Jewish culture in the early days of the Soviet regime.

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Soviet propaganda, particularly during and since World War II, has thus consistently avoided creating the impression among the Russian people that the Jews are a homogeneous group. Throughout the war the Soviet press and radio played down the fact that Nazi atrocities were being committed against Jews. Soviet propaganda stressed that Nazi atrocities were directed against the Russian people as a whole. A report on Auschwitz in the Soviet press, for example, failed even to use the word "Jew." A study of more than 600 Soviet radio commentaries dealing with Nazi atrocities, gas chambers, etc., during the war revealed that the word "Jew" appeared only a few times despite the obvious fact that the great majority of victims were Jewish. Moreover, although Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda is reported to have made strong inroads on the Russian mind,<sup>1</sup> the Kremlin never sought to counter the Nazi charges that "Jewish Bolsheviks" were responsible for the war.

The taboo on Jews as Jews in Soviet propaganda during and since World War II is also indicated by other practices. The positive contributions of Jews in the Soviet Union are not identified by Soviet propaganda as to racial origin; Western attempts to deduce the number of Jews among Stalin prize winners, for example, must guess by their names. Most striking of all is the almost complete propaganda silence on the subject of anti-Semitism both in the East and West.

Although, beginning in 1925, the Soviet press and Soviet officials waged a campaign against latent anti-Semitism in the USSR, no such propaganda has appeared since the end of the war despite evidence which points to a recrudescence of anti-Semitic feeling in the USSR and Eastern Europe due to the impact of Nazi propaganda and the strains and dislocations resulting from the war.<sup>2</sup> More outstanding is the fact that Soviet propaganda does not exploit anti-Semitism in the West. Since the end of the war neither Moscow radio nor the central press has ever broadcast or published a single article wholly devoted to the subject of Western anti-Semitism. They have alluded to it in passing in commentaries on the American and British domestic scenes, but these references have been minute in relation to the total stream of Soviet propaganda. The most recent manifestation of this policy is Moscow's complete silence on the Rosenberg case, which has been played rather heavily by Satellite media. East German as well as other Satellite media have stressed the "persecution of progressives" angle rather than the anti-Semitic angle, it may be noted.

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<sup>1</sup> The question of anti-Semitism in the USSR has been examined by Solomon A. Schwarz at the instance of the American Jewish Committee in a book titled: The Jews in the Soviet Union. Schwarz has made use of all the available Yiddish and Russian material, particularly the valuable collections of YIVO documents based on the experiences of Jewish emigres who were in Russia during the war. He cites many examples of anti-Semitism among Soviet partisans and peasantry and concludes that it increased under the impact of Nazi propaganda.

<sup>2</sup> Schwarz, op. cit., Part II

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The only sustained propaganda concerning anti-Semitism which has emanated from the Soviet radio since the end of the war appeared in the Yiddish to North America broadcast which was dropped in the spring of 1949 soon after the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in the USSR was abolished when the war-time effort to woo foreign, particularly American, Jewish support had become obsolete. Similarly, the only Cominform propaganda vehicles which have alluded to Western anti-Semitism are the Bucharest and Warsaw Yiddish transmissions.

#### B. THE JEWISH "COSMOPOLITANS"

From the end of World War II to the Prague trial Soviet propaganda manifested only once signs of anti-Semitism. This occurred in the great campaign against "cosmopolitans" in early 1949, a campaign which later broadened into a critique of all aspects of Soviet culture and art. The great majority of critics and artists caught up in this purge were Jews, and Soviet propagandists made note of the fact by including their original Jewish names in parentheses after the adopted Russian names. Propaganda on the "cosmopolitans" did not use the word "Jew."

The campaign against the "cosmopolitans," however, was not primarily an appeal to anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. The central thesis of the first attack on the Jewish literary "cosmopolitans" was that the concept of an "international Jewish people" was treasonable and that Yiddish literature in the Soviet Union had nothing whatever to do with that of the "dyed-in-the-wool businessmen" of Yiddish letters in America, Palestine and elsewhere. The authors of a literary glossary for the second edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia were severely criticized for "taking for granted" the existence of an international Jewish literature "regardless of differences between countries and government systems." The establishment of Israel had apparently developed a feeling of double allegiance among many Soviet Jewish intellectuals. Ilya Ehrenburg had already sounded the first warning note against double allegiance when, in the 21 September 1948 issue of PRAVDA, he decried sympathies for a "mystic" Jewish nation whose destiny was being shaped by "the intrusion of Anglo-American capital." This warning coincided with the beginning of the campaign against the "cosmopolitans" and officially launched the attack against Zionism.

The fact that most of the "cosmopolitans" were Jewish did not necessarily indicate a Soviet appeal to anti-Semitism. The Kremlin apparently felt that its Jewish minority, which had once been the most loyal in the Soviet Union, had become something of an Achilles heel.<sup>3</sup> When the Soviets

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<sup>3</sup> Schwarz, *op. cit.*, p. 2000: "Nazi horrors had made the Soviet Jews keenly aware of their Jewishness and they were prey to the tormenting thought that as a group they were unwanted even in the Soviet Union... there was frequently an articulate upsurge of Jewish national feeling. All documents describing the wartime experiences of Jews in the Soviet Union--letters, memoirs, testimonials of Displaced Persons--bear the imprint of this emotional crisis."

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supported Jewish nationalism in the General Assembly and received Israel's envoy, Golda Myerson, the spirit of Judaism must have been rekindled in many thousands of Soviet Jews. A Western correspondent has given a first-hand account of its manifestations.<sup>4</sup>

This feeling of kinship was a potential source of disaffection which ran counter to the order of the day, Great Russian nationalism, as indicated by Stalin's pronouncement, soon after the end of the war, that the Great Russians were the "greatest" of all nations in the USSR. The attack on the Jews thus formed part of a struggle against all internationalist strains in Soviet life, all forms of kowtowing to foreign culture, probably motivated by strategic considerations in the face of an intensified Cold War. The assault was directed not only against the Jews but also against the Ukrainians and other Soviet minorities and has been a consistent but minor theme in Soviet internal propaganda ever since 1948. The existence of Israel as a magnet to Eastern European Jewry and the Nazi-inspired reawakening of a feeling of Jewishness throughout Eastern Europe, particularly among Soviet intellectuals, apparently made the Jewish "cosmopolitans" somewhat unique and more dangerous in Kremlin eyes. But Soviet propagandists stopped utilizing Jewish names in the attack against cosmopolitanism in March 1949. A more sustained or blunter campaign might have undermined Communist parties throughout the world which contained a great number of Jews in key positions.

Another indication of cautious approach is the fact that Ilya Ehrenburg was chosen to make the first attack against Israel and the Zionist movement. What better way to offset the shock in Communist ranks and charges of anti-Semitism from the West than to utilize a well-known Soviet anti-Zionist Jew to launch the attack? Ehrenburg had snubbed Mrs. Golda Myerson, Israel's special envoy, because he had "no regard for a Russian-born Jew who speaks English" rather than Russian.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Edmund Stevens, Moscow correspondent of the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, wrote in the 10 January 1950 issue:

"With the State of Israel an accomplished fact Soviet policy-makers saw the chance to gain a foothold in the Middle East. Accordingly, Israel received a favorable press, and party lectures were organized on the subject.

"After one such lecture in Moscow, a man in the audience got up and asked the speaker how Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel should make their applications. Instead of answering, the speaker launched into a violent tirade, saying that such a question was unworthy of a loyal Soviet citizen, who should prize his birthright too much even to think of wanting to emigrate, and that the very idea was treasonable.

"When members of the Israel Legation, headed by Mrs. Golda Myerson, reached Moscow, they received a tremendous spontaneous ovation from the local Jews, first at the synagogue, then under the windows of their Metropol Hotel rooms--something without precedent in Soviet history. Immediately the Legation was flooded with inquiries about how to get to Israel..."

<sup>5</sup> Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, p. 275

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### C. SATELLITE PROPAGANDA

The silence of the Soviet press and radio on the subject of anti-Semitism is reflected in Satellite press and radio only to a degree. All have generally refused to attack anti-Semitism at home, to utilize it as a political weapon, or to exploit it very much against the West.

The Satellites are particularly less reticent in respect to Western anti-Semitism, however. For example, whereas Moscow has not even mentioned the Rosenberg espionage case, Satellite propaganda, particularly East German, has been rather heavy; but even here it has stressed the war preparations theme and utilized the case as an indication of persecution of "progressives" rather than as an instance of anti-Semitism.

Although there is not enough systematic evidence to determine what the relative emphasis among the several Satellites on Zionism and the Jewish question has been, it is the impression of monitors who also follow the press of their respective countries that the Rumanians have been the most vocal in attacking Zionism, the Poles next, the Hungarians and the East Germans somewhat further behind, and the Czechs considerably to the rear.

It is significant that the Czechs have heretofore been the least vocal of the Cominform countries in attacking Zionism. In fact, the propaganda surrounding the Slansky trial was one of the few broadsides against Zionism ever to have appeared in Czech propaganda. Czechs were the last of the Cominform countries to drop friendly relations with Israel. While Zionist offices were closed in Rumania, Hungary and Poland in late 1949 or early 1950, the Jewish Agency offices in Prague were not closed until December 1950. A feeling of friendship toward the Czechs persisted in Israel long after relations with Rumania and Hungary were deteriorating. Czech arms supplied during the war with the Arabs had, of course, a great deal to do with it.

Against this background the anti-Zionist aspects of the Prague trial serve as a specific against Czech Jewish Communists in positions of importance who were insufficiently screened for views on Zionism and as general therapy for any softhearted attitude towards Israel in Czechoslovakia. With broader reference to the whole Orbit, Czechoslovakia's record would qualify it as the site of an object-lesson for Jewish intellectuals, the party faithful, and East European Jewry in general. Zionism is herewith formally denounced as a heresy along with Trotskyism and Titoism.

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## II. ISRAEL AND ZIONISM - 1946 TO SLANSKY TRIAL

Since 1949, Satellite press and radio propaganda in Yiddish has sought to discourage emigration and to discredit Zionism and Israel. Soviet propaganda in this respect has been minimal and opportunistic, serving the development of Soviet foreign policy toward the Middle East. There have been no real propaganda campaigns against Israel in Soviet propaganda since relations between the two countries deteriorated, and virtually nothing on Zionism prior to the Prague trial.

### A. 1946-1949

Throughout 1946 and the early postwar period, Moscow maintained virtual silence on the international aspects of the Jewish question, despite the fact that it was already assuming major proportions. Illegal Jewish immigration into Palestine, the terrorist actions of the Stern gang and Irgun Zvai Leumi against British troops, and the developing Jewish-Arab conflict were making headlines throughout the world. Moscow had apparently not made up its mind which horse to back.

Soviet broadcasts to the Middle East and the Arab countries played upon largely hackneyed themes: the implications of the Anglo-Transjordan treaty as symbolized by the "British puppet" King Abdullah; the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations inspired by British imperialism's attempt to regain its preeminence in the Middle East; and the "oil imperialism" of both Britain and the United States.

Moscow's Yiddish broadcast to North America similarly ignored the Palestine problem. It dealt primarily with Jewish life in the Soviet Union, with the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, news of literature, art, the theater, music, sports and economic activities connected with Jewish personalities and institutions in the USSR. This broadcast, designed for foreign Yiddish-speaking consumption, was unique in that Jewish personalities and institutions were seldom discussed in broadcasts to other foreign audiences or to the Soviet people.

Diverging from Moscow's disregard of Palestine as a propaganda issue, Warsaw's Yiddish broadcast was already notable in the early postwar period for an extreme left-wing Zionist, anti-British line. These broadcasts contained news of economic and cultural relations between Jewish communities in Poland and Palestine, visits to Poland of Palestinian Jewish leaders, and the activities in Poland of such Zionist organizations as the Poaleh Zion and the Hashomer Hatsair. The "British imperialist" line formed the backdrop for most of the comment. In addition to attracting support from the sizeable Jewish population still remaining in Poland, Polish propagandists found Palestine a convenient issue on which to belabor the British. The propaganda was less pro-Zionist than anti-British.

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As the British attempt to settle directly the Palestine problem came to a dead end in early 1947 with the failure of the London Conference, Moscow slowly began to utilize the Palestine issue more and more in its Arabic services. Arabic commentaries began to speak of the deteriorating situation in Palestine, of Jewish "terrorism" resulting from British suppression, and of American and British attempts to increase the gap between Jew and Arab for strategic reasons. Moscow did not try to stir up the Arabs against the Jews but rather tried to play both sides against the British, who were accused of kindling internecine and religious strife while "progressive" Jewish and Arab organizations fought for the freedom and "independence" of Palestine.

When in February 1947 the British served notice that they would take the Palestine question to the United Nations, it seemed evident that the USSR would soon have to abandon its neutrality on the Palestine issue. There is nothing, however, in Soviet propaganda prior to the General Assembly Special Session which met in April and May 1947 to suggest that Soviet propagandists anticipated the pro-Zionist Soviet stand to be taken at Lake Success. Moscow radio continued to avoid the Palestine issue in most beams and to discuss it in its Arabic services along neutral anti-British lines.

This failure to anticipate the switch in Soviet policy is illustrated by a commentary, broadcast to the Arabs almost immediately prior to the General Assembly meeting, which made the following points: (1) the Palestine problem was the result of British imperialism which needed Palestine in order to safeguard its oil lines and because of its general strategic value; (2) British policy had changed from World War I, when its aim was to establish a Zionist state, to its policy after World War II, when it "pretended" to support the Arab liberation movement; (3) the British were now playing off the Jews against the Arabs in order to divide and rule; (4) both Arabs and Jews were peaceful peoples who wanted only peace and order; and (5) British press suggestions for the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states was in reality a British scheme for placing the Arab part of Palestine under Syrian hegemony and thus fulfilling Abdullah's "Greater Syria" program.

Thus in the month prior to Gromyko's first call for partition of Palestine before the General Assembly in May 1947, Soviet propagandists were implying that British suggestions for a partition were in reality a plot for installing the puppet Abdullah at the head of a Greater Syria.

At the General Assembly's special session on the Palestine question Gromyko left little doubt as to where the Soviet Union had decided to stand when he moved to invite representatives of the Jewish Agency to appear before the Assembly. In an early speech, Gromyko held that (1) the British mandate was unacceptable to both Jews and Arabs; (2) that the Jewish people were suffering great hardships; (3) that since both Jews and Arabs held historic rights in Palestine, it would be best if a unitary democratic state with equal rights for both peoples should be established; but (4) if such a state proved unworkable, Palestine should be partitioned into separate Arab and Jewish states.

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Naturally, Soviet propaganda reflected this change in the official Soviet attitude toward partition, but discussion of the sensitive issue was still held to a minimum. Propaganda on the U.N. session was largely confined to news accounts which were objective except for attempts to distort the American position by statements that America was "categorically opposed" to "independence" for Palestine. The terms of "independence," "self determination," and "equality," euphemisms for "partition," became more prominent in Soviet propaganda on Palestine after Gromyko's speech.

Soviet propagandists, as though cognizant of developing hostility toward the Soviet policy throughout the Arab world, attempted to justify the Soviet stand to Arabic audiences. One Arabic language commentary spoke of that section of the Middle East press which "feeds from the crumbs of the U.S. table," spreading "malicious rubbish" about the Soviet position. Commentators stressed that if it were not for British imperialism there would be no enmity between Arabs and Jews. TASS noted the support of Jewish workers in the United States and elsewhere for the Soviet proposals.

In September 1947 a U.N. Commission, which included representation from Czechoslovakia, recommended partition as a solution to the Palestine problem. The Arabs rejected the recommendation categorically. The Soviets supported the majority decision. In the months that followed, Soviet propaganda continued to stress to the Arabs the correctness of its position and also stepped up its attack on the Arab League and "reactionary" Arab circles as tools of the British. The favorite target was King Abdullah, who was accused of "promising bases to the British." Moscow comment in Arabic also continued to attack the British for stirring up the Arabs against the Jews and accused the Arab ruling cliques of attacking the Soviet stand on partition largely in order to divert the attention of the Arab masses from British imperialism.

By and large, however, as the Soviet pro-Zionist position emerged, the Arabic service tended to avoid concrete discussions of the Palestine question except when the opportunity arose to indict the Western powers. Moscow turned its Arabic propaganda to the British attempt to "stage a comeback in the Middle East" in order to divide the imperialist spoils with its more advantageously placed American partner. Anglo-American rivalry and struggle now became an important theme.

While Moscow's Arabic service was exhibiting some degree of reticence, Moscow's broadcasts in Yiddish to North America were making the most of Soviet support for the Jews. These broadcasts attacked Arab terrorism and "pogroms" in Jerusalem, the alleged American supply of arms to the Arabs with guns, and the U.S. reversal on partition. Other foreign-language broadcasts and the Home Service referred to the Israeli-Arab conflict only in passing as one aspect of the crisis of Anglo-American imperialism.

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Satellite propaganda to the Jews also made the most of Soviet backing for partition. Polish and Rumanian broadcasts in Yiddish and in Rumanian to Israel told the Jews of Eastern Europe and Palestine that the attitude of the Soviet Union toward Palestine had demonstrated that it had "correctly assessed the martyrdom of the Jewish people and the dangers at present threatening Jewry."

Within Poland and Rumania, Zionist organizations were enjoying what was to be a short-lived freedom of expression. At a meeting of the two largest Jewish parties in Poland at the Polish State Theater in October 1947, a huge picture of Borukhov, "the theorist of Socialist Zionism," was among those prominently displayed, according to a Warsaw broadcast. The Polish news agency, PAP, displayed what would now be unpardonable solicitude for Polish Jews who were refused entrance to the United States. "It is unthinkable that the representatives of the surviving remnants of Polish Jewry should be deprived of the means of direct contact with their U.S. brethren, who have been giving and are still giving moral and material help."

On 15 May 1948, the British mandate was ended, the state of Israel was proclaimed, and the Arab armies invaded Palestine. For the first two months, Soviet propaganda gave maximum coverage to the Arab-Jewish war in news reports and commentary in virtually all language beams. That the conflict was considered to have a moral for the Russian people is evident from the stress placed on it in PRAVDA, which devoted several leaders to the beginning of hostilities. The Home Service continued to devote considerable attention to the war until the summer of 1948, when news reports and comment slowly faded.

Propaganda mainly attempted to illustrate that the Arab-Jewish conflict was initiated by the British and Americans with the aid of their Arab puppets. The theme of Anglo-American disunity over the Middle East also came into prominence during the early course of the war. The authoritative Soviet historical journal, "Questions of History," said, "although for 25 years there had existed in Palestine an unholy alliance between American gold and the British bayonet, the Arab-Jewish war represented the first open breach in Anglo-American relations since the Second World War." Soviet propaganda continually sought to illustrate this disunity throughout the course of the war.

Moscow broadcasts to the Arabs continued to support the pro-Zionist policy which had been laid down by Gromyko, telling them that the Arab invasion would only further the aims of American and British imperialists and that each Arab country fighting in Palestine had its own selfish ambitions. Abdullah wanted a Greater Syria, Farouk dreamed of the Caliphate, and Ibn Saud wished to extend his territory. This playing off of one Arab country against the other was new in Soviet propaganda.

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Soviet propagandists also told the Arabs that their fighting men in Palestine were being used as pawns by their reactionary ruling cliques who were in the pay of Britain, and that these ruling cliques were holding Palestine as the "ace card" by which they hoped to subjugate public opinion and maintain their influence. While Iraqi soldiers were fighting "the Jewish farmers and workers in Palestine," the Iraqi police were ready to pounce on any Iraqi workers who dared to grumble.

Although Moscow did make the point that the Arab ruling classes as well as the British were to blame for the Palestine fighting, the main brunt of Moscow's propaganda continued to be directed against the British. The British were out to further their own colonial policy in the Palestine war. The USSR did not confine its support to the independence of Israel but also wished "to deliver the Arabs of Palestine from the bondage of British imperialism." But, although the Soviet Union would continue to defend the independence of the Arab peoples, the fact remained that they "have waged an armed aggression against the state of Israel" and were "attempting by violent means to prevent the Jewish people from creating their own state in accord with the United Nations decision."

By the end of 1948, the Arab-Israeli war was coming to a halt, the British had more or less been eliminated from Palestine, and Israel was beginning to stabilize itself. Soviet and Satellite comment dropped off during the summer of 1948 and did not ever regain its previous level.

In September 1948, Ehrenburg's article in PRAVDA appeared warning Jews against any double allegiance. LITERARY GAZETTE followed suit with the warning that the concept of "an international Jewish people" was treasonable. The campaign against "cosmopolitans" in the Soviet press began to take systematic form in January and February of 1949.

Hints and rumors of impending Cominform action against Jews in Eastern Europe also began to develop toward the latter part of 1948. It was claimed by several foreign radios that it was becoming increasingly difficult for Hungarian Zionists to get exit visas and that the Hungarian government was using Zionists as a bargaining weapon for Israeli trade. Rumors of an impending purge of Jews in the Hungarian Communist Party were in the air.

Toward the end of December 1948, NEW TIMES published an article broadcast only in Yiddish to North America, which apparently for the first time criticized the "anti-Soviet sections of the Israeli press" for spreading slanders about the position of the Jews in the Soviet Union. In December 1949 the Zionist offices in Warsaw and Bucharest were closed, and although Jewish emigration from Rumania was not banned until a year later, it ceased to all intents and purposes. The Hungarian Zionist offices were closed in March 1949. The Jewish Agency offices in Prague were not closed until October 1950.

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On 23 February 1949, the Rumanian Communist Party paper SCANTEIA published an editorial, which also was broadcast, entitled: "Let Us Unmask Zionism, the Poisoned Weapon of Imperialism." This article claimed that Jewish workers had been misled by Zionist propaganda and had abandoned their jobs, that the situation in Israel attested to the falsity of Zionist claims that they had achieved national unity inasmuch as there was a class struggle going on there, and that there was only one unity for Jews, the unity with the workers in all countries. Zionism was declared to be part of the "imperialists' plans for the restoration of fascism." From this time on, Jewish groups were infrequently quoted in Warsaw and Bucharest Yiddish broadcasts to the effect that they were struggling against the reactionary Zionist propaganda.

A notable element from the beginning of this attack on Zionism was its target of "Diaspora Zionism," the movement toward and sympathy for Israel and a Jewish homeland on the part of Eastern European Jewry, not the foreign policy of Israel. Now that Israel had consolidated itself, the Communist leaders must have become concerned about the attraction it would have on the Jews of the Orbit, as well as on the many Jews in the Communist Party throughout the world. A double loyalty was a potential source of disaffection which also ran counter to the campaign which Moscow was now beginning to wage against all forms of internationalism.

## B. 1949-1952

### 1. 1949: Increasing Hostility

During the spring and summer of 1949, Israel's position of neutrality between the two hostile camps in the world was becoming untenable. Soviet propaganda on Israel had come to the standstill characteristic of its treatment of neutrals in the Cold War, and only TASS reported a smattering of news items, some sympathetic and some critical. Items on unemployment, strikes, etc., increased as the Israeli Government moved further away from the Soviet camp.

In May, Warsaw made one of its first attacks on the World Jewish Congress, which it said was attached to the "reactionary Jewish bourgeoisie, which since the establishment of the state of Israel has set out to do the bidding of the Mapai clerical Israeli Government, striving to trade Israel to Anglo-Saxon imperialism." This was one of the strongest epithets so far applied to the Israeli Government by Cominform media.

A trade agreement was signed between Poland and Israel on 20 May 1949 (a year before the Czech trade agreement, which was to become one of the reasons for indicting the "pro-Zionist" Slanskyites), but the second anniversary of Gromyko's U.N. speech on Israel's independence occasioned a Soviet news item quoting the Secretary of the Israeli Soviet Friendship Society as saying that "the people of Israel will not permit their country to be converted into an Anglo-U.S. military base," one of the earliest such references. Several days later, TASS corrected the



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Israeli Labor Ministry on unemployment figures in Israel from 5,000 to 12,000. The Israeli radio, however, continued to speak of "constructive neutrality" and to put out violent anti-British propaganda.

In May 1949, Mrs. Golda Myerson was replaced as Israeli Minister to the USSR and Moshe Sharrett, Israeli Foreign Minister, made a trip to Czechoslovakia to visit Foreign Minister Clementis. Arab radio stations reported developing tension between the Israeli and the Russians and claimed that Sharrett had gone to ask Clementis to intervene with the Russians. On 30 May the Israeli Ambassador to Poland officially denied reports of the Polish hostility to Zionism, pointing to the new trade agreement as evidence of mutual good will.

The question of Jewish emigration from the Satellite countries was apparently becoming a thorn in the relations between Israel and the Communist countries. The Israeli radio quoted the PALESTINE POST on the stiff attitude toward emigration of the Rumanian Government. The Israeli Minister in Poland said that "despite restrictions" hundreds of Jews were leaving every month, adding the assurance that "hardly any anti-Semitism existed in Poland anymore." The Israeli Government and its radio and press were leaning over backwards to avoid unnecessary aggravations in relations with Satellite countries, but it was apparent that the Satellites had taken Ehrenburg's hint.

On 9 June TASS reported the arrest of 25 Arab Communists in Galilee. On 10 June the Israeli radio reported that ten Zionist leaders were to go on trial in Budapest on 18 June for assisting Jews across the border illegally. The Hungarian radio was silent on the subject. Two weeks later a brief Budapest item reported that eight Hungarian Zionists had been sentenced for terms of six months to three years for helping 1,500 Jews leave Hungary. This was the first such trial in any Satellite country. Jewish emigration was now officially a crime. The text of the indictment was never broadcast over the Hungarian radio, but the prosecutor described Zionism as "implying assistance to imperialism." The Israeli Government stated that this accusation was not just, that other states with "regimes similar to that of Hungary's" had adopted a different attitude toward Jewish emigration, and that the Israeli Government had not yet given up hope of agreement on Jewish emigration with all countries concerned. The Israeli radio added its greetings to the condemned Zionists "whatever the circumstances."

Four days after the announcement of the sentence, Soviet commentator Lemin, in a rare commentary devoted wholly to Israel, charged that the United States had sought to convert Israel into a "base for domination of the Arab East." He noted that the Export-Import Bank had recently granted Israel a loan and that talks were in progress for further "usurious" credits. He concluded that the U.S. had "considerable influence in Israeli high circles." Several TASS items in July 1949 noted unrest in Israel and the signing of a "binding agreement" between Israel and Standard Oil.

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Throughout this cooling-off period Moscow and the Satellite radios ignored the Israeli-Arab conflict. There was virtually no comment on such issues as the question of Arab refugees, the dispute over the Negev, the Trans-Jordan demand for an outlet to the Mediterranean, and the armistice negotiations. Whatever small bits of news that appeared were related explicitly to the British or American imperialists. The campaign against the Arab League and the ruling cliques of the Arab world had also come to a halt.

Although the Israel Government had sought to create the impression after the Hungarian trial of Zionists that Jewish emigration was proceeding smoothly from other Satellite countries, this was obviously not so. In late July the Israeli Foreign Minister announced that he had received no reply to a letter sent to the Rumanian Foreign Minister on the question of Jewish emigration from Rumania.

In August Moscow began to show increased concern over the "closer relations" between America and Israel. On the eve of the London Conference of Western diplomats in the Middle East Moscow said that the Americans had allotted a "not unimportant role" to Israel and expressed concern over the "infiltration of U.S. oil companies into Israel." The secretary of the Israeli Communist Party was quoted as criticizing the government for "tying itself to the chariot of U.S. imperialism." The accent was on American "plans" and American attempts at penetration--military and economic--of Israel.

On 1 November Warsaw in Yiddish attacked the "Zionist reactionaries," and claimed that anti-Semitism was a product of capitalism. It called on Jewish workers to stay in Poland and lashed out at the "agitation of reactionary elements among Jewish workers." In October Warsaw warned that "Polish Jews must raise their voices against the warmongers' assistants in New York and Paris." Comment from Bucharest in Yiddish on the Rajk trial said that the Jewish workers must "rout the agents of the U.S. imperialists in the ranks of the Jewish working masses in Rumania." Home broadcasts in Rumanian said that the Jewish masses in Rumania must combat nationalism in their own ranks, and all Yiddish broadcasts ended: "Long live the Rumanian People's Republic."

Rumanian Yiddish propaganda stressed that the "integration of Jews into productive work" was the only answer to Jewish nationalism. Zionism was already "a tool of imperialism," a "nationalist, reactionary movement of the Jewish bourgeoisie which was trying to estrange the Jewish workers from the peoples in whose midst they lived and make them give up the struggle against their own bourgeoisie." Zionists were spreading the malicious theories of "permanent anti-Semitism" although it was well known that anti-Semitism had been eradicated in the People's Democracies. The USSR, it was pointed out, showed an example of how the Jewish masses could be integrated into the productive processes.

It should be noted, however, that albeit Zionism and Jewish Nationalism were thus attacked in Yiddish broadcasts the general propaganda approach was primarily along class lines. A play at the Bucharest Jewish State Theater in October 1949 cast as its heroes a group of Jews in the Auschwitz camp who organized an uprising but were betrayed by a former Jewish capitalist. The play ends with the return of two inmates to Rumania where

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Bucharest Yiddish broadcasts sought, in these attacks on Zionism, to divert any suspicion of anti-Semitism by (1) pointing up anti-Semitism in the West, where it was used as a "weapon in the hands of the warmongers" and (2) by stressing that the Jewish workers were combatting both anti-Semitism and Jewish bourgeois nationalism, twin enemies of the working class. The struggle against nationalism of every kind and against anti-Semitism, it claimed, had assumed an "official character" in the People's Democracies. This is much the same defensive propaganda that has emanated from Satellite radios following the Slansky trial.

The same thing was true of Polish Yiddish propaganda. Polish broadcasts emphasized during this month that anti-Semitism in prewar Poland was a product of capitalism and that this was fully realized by the Jewish workers in Poland who gave their support to the revolution. It called upon Jewish workers to remain and help build Socialist Poland. It said that agitation carried on by "reactionary elements among Jewish workers" to leave the country was considered as "damaging action."

The Governor of Lower Silesia in October declared that there was no more discrimination against the Jewish minority there, noting that the government had turned Jewish schools into State schools. The Governor went on to speak of certain Jews who had not yet become acclimated in Poland. "Those who do not like the conditions existing in our country and want to leave it may do so."

An anniversary of the founding of the Jewish Cultural Society in Poland provided an occasion in late October for Warsaw radio to praise its activities for raising the cultural and educational level of the Jewish masses and establishing contacts between the "progressive" Jewish and the new Polish progressive culture "although to a degree which is far from sufficient." A Warsaw Yiddish broadcast in October proclaimed that "every Jew leaving the People's Democracies and Poland weakens the campaigns for peace and strengthens the front of those who are preparing for war."

## 2. 1950-52: Attack on Israeli Government

Until January 1950 Moscow's attitude toward the Israeli Government, although cool, was marked by relative restraint. The new year saw the beginning of a new phase in Soviet propaganda on Israel.

A court case brought against the newspaper KOL HAAM, organ of the Israeli Communist Party, was interpreted in a Tel Aviv TASS dispatch on 16 January as "a change on the part of the Government from persecution of individual Communist Party members to a campaign against the Communist Party as a whole and against all progressive forces in Israel." The dispatch observed that "the Government of Israel is following in the footsteps of the American reactionaries who organized the injurious trial of the leaders of the American Communist Party." This was the first direct Soviet attack on the Israeli Government. Several days later, the Rumanian radio also attacked the "reactionary Government of Ben Gurion" and a

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further Tel Aviv TASS dispatch drew attention to plans for building through Israeli territory a section of the Istanbul-Cairo road which was "likely to weaken Israeli security and could serve only to implement American imperialism's anti-Soviet strategical plans." This Moscow comment was the first suggestion of active Israeli collusion with the Western imperialists.

From January to June 1950, Soviet propaganda continued this attack on the Israeli Government and its flirtation with the United States in a sustained low key. At the end of January, for example, Moscow radio attacked Morgenthau's visit to Israel as an attempt to create an aggressive Middle Eastern bloc in which Israel would participate, and TASS began to stress the danger of Israeli involvements in such blocs. On 26 March, the first full-blown attack on a personality in the Israeli Government appeared in a LITERARY GAZETTE article, not broadcast, attacking Foreign Minister Sharrett. The unprecedented personal attack provoked immediate reactions in Jerusalem, where the Israeli radio reported that there was a possibility of official reaction. Almost simultaneously there appeared in the organ of the Jewish Democratic Committee in Rumania two articles, not broadcast, against Zionism and the Israeli Government. The first article attacked emigration, and the second one, "Titoism and Zionism--Two Agents of Imperialist Warmongers," was illustrated by a caricature of the Israeli Premier walking arm-in-arm with Marshal Tito. This was apparently the first attempt to link Zionism directly with "imperialist warmongering" and "Titoism." On 29 March Agerpress reported a ROMANIA LIBERA indictment of Ben Gurion for the persecution of Israeli workers and "enslavement of Israel" by American imperialists. Bucharest in Yiddish told listeners that "we must unmask Zionism, the agency of imperialist monopolists. Zionism is an enemy of peace."

In April 1950 the arrival of Jules Moch in Israel occasioned a violent broadcast from Warsaw which called him "the hired criminal executioner of the French people" who was "acting on instructions given him by the U.S. State Department." "Moch's goods were in great demand among the Israeli rulers, who could not contest the growing agitation of people wanting work, housing and peace. He can teach them how to break up a hunger strike. In Israel Moch is among people of his own kind, people who will fall over themselves to get a good mark and a present from their U.S. bosses."

The transition from 1949 to 1950 is illustrated by a comparison of the Warsaw radio treatment of the 1949 and 1950 anniversaries of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of April 1943.

In April 1949, the sixth anniversary, Warsaw warned in Yiddish broadcasts that Hitler's heirs, the Anglo-Saxon imperialists and warmongers and "their Jewish helpers," were pushing mankind into another war. Nevertheless wreaths were placed at the Ghetto monument on behalf of Hashomer Hatsaer, the young Zionist organization, Poaleh Zion and other Zionist youth organizations. It was stressed that resistance to Hitler came from all Jewish groups, including the Bund and the Zionists, who were contrasted to the "Jewish demagogues of London, New York and Tel Aviv." (It is noteworthy that this criticism of Jewish circles was utilized

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only in Yiddish propaganda and not for other audiences. The Polish Home Service mentioned the anniversary but utilized the theme of American protection of war criminals who were responsible for the suffering of the Jews. This is one of the many instances showing how carefully the Cominform media avoided playing on anti-Semitism.)

In April 1950 a talk in Yiddish from Warsaw commemorating the seventh anniversary took an entirely different line. It claimed that numerous books and reminiscences concerning the uprising had given a false picture. During the occupation, "many dangerous theories prospered in the Ghetto and helped the Hitlerite policy of extermination. One was that of the traitor Rumkowski who argued that the Ghetto, by preserving its national characteristics, would be a means of salvation for the Jews." Other theories were based on fatalism which abandoned any thought of resistance and the policy of "wait and see" which easily turned into collaboration with the occupiers. "These were particularly the attitudes of the Zionists and the Bund, the Jewish Social Democratic organization. It was in fact only the appearance of the Jewish members of the Polish Workers Party which began to rally the revolutionary elements. Without them there would have been no rising." Polish press statements on the seventh anniversary did not similarly accuse the Zionists of "collaboration" but noted that the Jewish fighters were persecuted as "Jews, Poles and revolutionaries."

The attack on Zionism and the state of Israel entered a new and intensified phase soon after the Israeli decision to support the U.N. decision on Korea in June 1950. NEW TIMES declared on 13 July that Israel had now openly placed itself on the side of the American aggressors. LITERARY GAZETTE on 21 July called Israeli Foreign Minister Sharrett, in a commentary entitled "Acheson at the War Dance," a "henchman" of the warmongers, who, it made clear, did not represent the Israeli people.

The main burden of the intensified campaign was left to Bucharest and Warsaw, primarily the former. Soon after the start of the Korean War, Bucharest commenced a new series of broadcasts in Rumanian for "all decent people" abroad, which was beamed to Israel and which opened with a vitriolic blast at Ben Gurion. This transmission has since led the Cominform propaganda attacks on Israel.

The Bucharest transmission declared that the Israeli Government attempted to persuade Rumanian Jews to emigrate to Israel largely because they needed "cheap labor and cannon fodder." Such words as "flunkey," "Marshallized haven," "Ben Gurion clique," "fascist," "imperialist," "dregs of society," "spies, chauvinist elements and Zionists," etc. became standard usage in these broadcasts. The Cominform home services, however, did not utilize such abusive language.

Warsaw's Yiddish transmission called the Korean decision an act of "national treason" on the part of the "Ben Gurion imperialist, fascist clique" and followed this with a stream of abuse. Both Warsaw and Bucharest now accused Israel of chauvinism and racial persecution of the

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Arabs and oriental Jews such as the Yemenites, of being the lackey of the American warmongers, of drawing closer into the Middle Eastern bloc, of giving free rein to the "bourgeois class" and so to inflation, unemployment, poor housing, etc., of persecuting its peace partisans and its Communists, and of economic bankruptcy. In short, the broadcasts in Yiddish and to Israel in Rumanian now ran the whole gamut of charges which Soviet propaganda has been utilizing about the West and the United States since 1948.

The internal Cominform campaign was relatively subdued, however, and Moscow remained aloof. The Kremlin was apparently not surprised by Israel's support of the Korean decision: there were no major articles in PRAVDA or IZVESTIA attacking it, and in the six months following there was no increase in Moscow's still virtually negligible attention to Israel. Only a few scattered TASS items reported the persecution of peace partisans and war preparations, unemployment, etc. Thus the bulk of anti-Zionist propaganda appeared in services intended for Rumanian and Polish Jews who had emigrated to Israel or for Jews throughout Europe. There was little comment in any of the Cominform countries' home services, and virtually nothing from Prague.

That Rumania would be having the most difficulty of the Cominform countries with its Jewish population would be evident from the size of its Jewish population, some 270,000 according to the 1952 yearbook of the World Jewish Congress. It is not surprising then that Bucharest spearheaded the anti-Zionist campaign.

The second mass arrest of Zionists began in Rumania in August 1950. Forty Zionist leaders and rank-and-file Zionists were imprisoned, according to the Israeli Government information based on reports from Jewish refugees. The Israeli Government at this time was still bending over backwards to maintain good relations with the Cominform. Foreign Minister Sharrett, for example, had declared after the LITERARY GAZETTE attack on him that Soviet policy was not to be judged by the Soviet press. The Rumanian press and radio remained silent about the arrests, however, despite an official resolution of protest passed by Mapai several weeks later. At the time, there were many rumors of an impending large-scale trial to discredit Zionism throughout Eastern Europe and particularly in Rumania. The Israeli radio reported that 50,000 Jews were at the time awaiting exit permits from Rumania.

Israeli relations with Poland were still tolerable, however. On 24 January 1951 a Polish trade delegation arrived in Israel to renew the Israeli-Polish trade agreement and the Israeli radio announced that Jewish emigration from Poland would continue in 1951 after an agreement with the Polish government. Similarly, it was announced that an agreement had been signed with Hungary to allow for the emigration of 3,000 Jews in addition to the 1,800 already evacuated. This was still a minute segment of the Jewish population, however.

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In the spring of 1951, Moscow comment on Israel, virtually negligible until then, picked up somewhat with increasing references to Israel's role in the projected Middle Eastern defense arrangement. A Home Service article in March, for example, described Israel as a strategic country which stands "at the approaches to the Suez Canal" and went on to discuss Ben Gurion's trip to Athens as part of the Western attempt to form an aggressive Middle Eastern pact. A commentary in English discussed Israel's conversion into a military springboard.

In November, Moscow sent a brisk note to the Israeli Government warning it against joining the Middle East military agreement, action which would be interpreted as a sign of aggression by the Soviet government. After this note, Moscow's Arabic service for the first time began to play on Arab-Jewish rivalry. In December 1951 a broadcast in Arabic said:

"For quite a long time, Wall Street has been exaggerating Israel's military strength with the idea of scaring the Arabs. Now a U.S. Congressman has announced that Israel will in the near future occupy her place in the Middle East Command...."

"The dispatch of Israeli and Turkish forces to the Arab countries makes it clear that the United States and Britain are using their satellites as gendarmes in the Arab East."

Although this comment and similar usages of Arab-Jewish rivalry were not often heard subsequently even in the Arabic services, they represent a new departure for the Soviet radio.

Throughout 1952, Warsaw and Bucharest in their broadcasts to the Jews continued to carry the propaganda effort against Israel. Moscow's chief references appeared in comment on the Middle East Command, warning against Israeli participation. Bucharest and Warsaw attacked the Ben Gurion government for being subservient to Wall Street, for militarization, black markets, exploitation of workers, unemployment and inflation.

Scattered comments on Israel and the Middle East Command from Moscow became relatively numerous throughout the latter part of 1952, mainly contained in news items and in commentaries to the Arabs. Israel has still not become a real propaganda target. In May, for example, a long commentary in Arabic on the MEC claimed that Israel "will sign a separate military alliance with the United States and become a member of the aggressive bloc in the Middle East." In August, Moscow in Arabic quoted the Vienna DER ABEND on alleged American bargaining for the territory of Syria and Lebanon. It was claimed that negotiations were underway between Israel, Turkey and the United States with the ultimate aim that "Turkey should take over direct control of strategic bases in Syria and Lebanon in the event of any tension." Israel in turn had asked for a redefining of frontiers at the expense of Lebanese territory near Lake Hula. A news item from L'HUMANITE broadcast to the Arabs discussed the persecution of Arabs in Israel.

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Bucharest in its service for Rumanians abroad continued to carry the brunt of the attack. It discussed the increasing anti-Semitism in the United States, disclosed that "in Kansas any person who has more than 25 percent Jewish blood cannot live within the territory," complained of discrimination in American colleges, and said that U.S. loyalty committees asked the question: "Do you have any Jewish friends?" It continued to berate Israel for the high cost of living, strikes for higher wages, selling Israel's national interest to the U.S. monopolies and remilitarization on Washington's orders.

Thus until the Slansky trial the propaganda campaign was directed only to European Jewish and Israeli audiences. There was still no general use of anti-Zionist propaganda elsewhere.

### III. THE SLANSKY TRIAL. AND SOVIET DOCTOR-PLOT

The propaganda pattern up to the Prague trial can be summarized as follows:

1. The bulk of propaganda on the Jewish question has been directed to the Jews themselves (largely from Rumania and Poland) and has been targeted on "Diaspora Zionism" and Israel. The attacks on Israel have been such as to blacken the image of life in Israel and the concept of a Jewish state, so as to discourage potential Jewish emigrants.
2. There has been no attempt to exploit the Jewish question, anti-Semitism, Israeli policy or Zionism in propaganda to the Arabs or to Orbit audiences.
3. Propaganda on the Jewish question has been cautious. The Soviets have not tried to utilize latent anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe nor to combat it.
4. The primary Soviet propaganda theme against Israel has been entirely divorced from the Jewish question in propaganda to non-Jewish audiences and has been rather Israel's role in the Middle East Command. Even such Soviet propaganda on Israel has been negligible.

The Slansky trial, the Soviet doctor-plot, and related developments constitute a relative deluge on the Jewish question. In the light of the pattern since the war, this appears to indicate that the loyalty of the Jews--Communists, intellectuals, and masses alike--a loyalty which had been in question ever since the consolidation of Israel in 1948, is recognized as one of the principal vulnerabilities in Orbit security. The Jews, the most loyal Soviet minority during the war in the face of Nazi ideology, have become the most potentially disloyal now that Zionism is an active force. Golda Myerson's unprecedented welcome in Moscow in 1948, postwar criticism of Soviet Jewish writers, and Soviet and Cominform



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propaganda all indicate that the longing for a Jewish homeland and the feeling of Jewish unity are still strong throughout the Orbit and in Western Communist parties. They were encouraged in 1948 when Communist propaganda endorsed Zionism. They probably particularly affected Jewish intellectuals, who constitute an important element in Communist ranks.

That the Kremlin has embarked on a campaign which may well inflame anti-Semitism throughout the Orbit testifies to the expediency which modifies its doctrinal position on anti-Semitism and to the seriousness with which it now regards the problem of Jewish loyalty. It has apparently not been successful in destroying Jewish consciousness even among the assimilated Soviet Jews. The Jews throughout the Orbit and in Western Communist parties therefore remain a potential cohesive group with foreign allegiance and consequently a potential source of opposition to the Kremlin leadership. This is, of course, particularly true in Rumania, Poland and Hungary.

There is no indication that the Kremlin proposes to imitate Hitler in the use of racist anti-Semitism with the ultimate intention of wiping out the Jews. On the contrary, there are some signs, as the award of the Stalin prize to Ehrenburg, of measures to forestall indiscriminate anti-Semitism. The latent anti-Semitism in the peoples of Eastern Europe can be used as an expedient weapon, however, to combat a potential locus of opposition. The aim of the Prague trial in this perspective would be to place Zionism alongside Titoism, Trotskyism and Socialism as heresy which can no longer be tolerated. As in the case of these other heresies, the propaganda would magnify the strength of the opposition elements so as not only to crush any real opposition but also to intimidate potential opposition.

It is fairly clear that the campaign is not mounted exclusively against Zionism and Jewish "bourgeois nationalism." The great stress on the complacency-espionage-vigilance theme and the unprecedented attack on the Soviet security organs since the doctor-plot suggest that the Jews are once again, as in the campaign against the "cosmopolitans," only part of a larger target, the tightening of internal discipline.

Although it is apparent that the aims of Soviet foreign policy would not be damaged if the anti-Zionist echoes of the Prague trial and the doctor-plot were heard and amplified in the Arab world, as they were in fact by Damascus and other Moslem propagandists, Soviet radio propaganda to the Arab world has not sought to capitalize on these developments, just as it has not sought so to capitalize on anti-Zionist propaganda in the past. Any benefits accruing to Soviet foreign policy, therefore, will be the by-product of a campaign aimed at the correction of internal conditions.

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